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Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: 





Just as in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non-wage benefits such 
as housing, medical care or day care to their employees. Interpreting this as a strategic choice 
of firms in an imperfect labor market, this paper examines unique survey data for 404 large 
and medium-size industrial establishments from 40 Russian regions. We find strong evidence 
that Russian industrial firms use social services to reduce the costs of labor turnover in the 
face of tight labor markets. The strongest effect is observed for blue-collar workers. We also 
find that the share of non-monetary compensation decreases with improved access to local 
social services.  
 
Keywords: Non-wage benefits, labor turnover, labor attachment, Russia 
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Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: 





Samaan tapaan kuin vakiintuneissa markkinatalouksissa monet yritykset Venäjällä tarjoavat 
työntekijöilleen palkan ohella luontoisetuja, kuten asunnon ja terveydenhoito- tai lasten päi-
vähoitopalveluita. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan luontoisetujen tarjontaa strategisena pää-
töksenä epätäydellisillä työmarkkinoilla. Aineistona on yli 400 suurta ja keskisuurta teolli-
suusyritystä Venäjän 40 alueella. Tulokset osoittavat, että venäläiset teollisuusyritykset tar-
joavat sosiaalipalveluita vähentääkseen työvoiman vaihtuvuutta ja siitä johtuvia kustannuk-
sia, joutuessaan kilpailemaan työvoimasta. Tämä vaikutus on merkittävämpi työntekijöiden 
kuin toimihenkilöiden pitämisessä. Lisäksi havaitaan, että luontoisetujen osuus yritysten ko-
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1  Introduction 
 
While provision of non-wage, or fringe, benefits for workers is a widespread phenomenon, 
the motivations for providing non-wage benefits have been discussed mostly in the context of 
developed market economies. Previous literature examines such explanations as tax benefits 
(e.g. Woodbury and Hamermesh, 1992), heterogeneous worker preferences for benefits and 
imperfections of outside markets for services (Dye and Antle, 1984), economies of scale in 
services provision, and efforts to reduce turnover in the face of rising costs of labor turnover 
(Rice, 1966). Atrostic (1982) shows that non-pecuniary job characteristics are an important 
determinant of labor supply. Woodbury (1983) and Olson (2002) test the degree of substitu-
tion between wage and non-wage benefits, finding that wages and wage supplements are eas-
ily substituted for each other, and that having firm-provided health insurance reduces wages 
by approximately 20%, an estimate close to the market value of insurance. 
In the planned Soviet economy, however, industrial firms were also charged with sup-
plying a great variety of non-wage benefits.”
2 In particular, they shouldered the obligation of 
supporting social assets such as housing, medical facilities and daycare services. Despite a 
law on transfer of social assets to municipalities in the mid-1990s and generally heavy re-
structuring of the Russian economy, many firms actively continue to provide social services. 
The shift, instead, has been away from keeping assets within the firm to other forms of em-
ployee support (for a detailed survey, see Haaparanta et al., 2003).  
In this paper, we test whether social service provision has transmuted from an obliga-
tion imposed on firms into a strategic tool for attracting and attaching employees in a tight 
labor market. Using survey data of 404 large and medium-size industrial establishments in 
Russia, gathered in 2003, we examine the interaction between labor market tightness, social 
service provision, and employee turnover.
3 We believe Russia provides a good case for test-
                                                 
2 For Russia-specific discussion, see Stryk and Kosareva (1994), Commander and Schankerman (1997), Leksin 
and Shvetsov (1998) and (1999), Starodubrovskaya (2002). For an early survey of enterprise and social benefits 
in various Central and Eastern European countries after communism, see Rein et al. (1997), and Svejnar (1999). 
3 In companion papers (e.g. Haaparanta and Juurikkala 2004, Juurikkala and Lazareva 2006), we also analyze 
the role of the public sector and the so-called Russian-style fiscal federalism, as well as the effect of firms capa-
ble of  capturing public sector decision-making as the determinants of social service provision. See also Zhu-
ravskaya (2000), Sonin (2003), Makrushin et al. (2003), and Slinko et al. (2005) for analyses of these relation-
ships. 
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ing the role of non-wage benefits in a developing economy with imperfect labor markets and 
large regional heterogeneity. 
The idea that non-wage benefits can be used by firms to reduce labor turnover is har-
dly new. However, the attachment mechanism treated in the majority of related papers is spe-
cific to the pension plans and health insurance that constitute the bulk of non-wage benefits to 
workers in developed economies. In a framework similar to bonding or efficiency-wage mo-
dels, the pension plan is a form of deferred payment that imposes a separation penalty on the 
worker (i.e. all or part of a worker’s contributions are forfeited if they quit before vesting), 
and hence limits turnover (Rice, 1966; Even and Macpherson,1996; Gustman et al., 1994). 
Alternatively, firms offering pension plans may be seen to attract saver-types who are less 
likely to quit (Ippolito, 2002).  Empirically, Decressin et al. (2005) show on a large US data-
set that health benefits do indeed diminish worker churning. 
Non-wage benefits in Russian firms, in contrast, are mostly services and facilities 
provided or subsidized by the employer. These include housing, day care, recreation, and 
medical services. Consumption of these services is immediate rather than deferred, though 
they may still carry a separation penalty. A worker who quits is likely to incur fixed costs for 
arranging new housing, day care or medical care. Oyer (2005) also finds that in the United 
States, the fact that it is costly for workers to match with firms that offer the benefits they va-
lue has an effect on firms’ decisions about which benefits to offer. These matching costs are 
the higher the lower the number of alternative providers of these services in the region.  
Commander and Schankerman (1997) were among the first ones In the Russian con-
text to point out that any restructuring of firm-provided social benefits depends crucially on 
the availability of alternative providers. In this framework, social benefits represent an in-
kind compensating differential for the quality of local social infrastructure.
4 Russia, with its 
huge disparities in the level of development of regional labor markets and markets for social 
services, provides a good ground for testing this hypothesis. The attachment effect of benefits 
should be especially important, as the social sector in the country is still heavily regulated and 
subsidized, and thus a difficult market to enter for potential new service providers. 
                                                 
4 For the general theory on compensating differentials, see Rosen (1986). Compensating differentials for local-
specific amenities in Russia have been tested in Berger et al. (2003), who find that workers in Russia are com-
pensated for the local climate, environmental conditions, and crime rates. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Two previous studies explain service provision by the labor market distortions arising 
during transition process.
5 Grosfeld et al. (2001) demonstrate that the Russian labor market is 
segmented into a pool of low-productivity workers and a dynamic segment of mobile, high-
productivity workers. They argue that less productive workers engage in contractual relation-
ships similar to risk insurance contracts, whereby the employee accepts lower wages in ex-
change for security and social services. Risk in this setting may be related to the non-payment 
of wages which was widespread in Russian firms during the 1990s. The theoretical model in 
Grosfeld et al. also incorporates the fixed cost for searching out new service providers in-
curred by a worker who quits a benefits-providing firm. 
Another important feature of the Russian labor market is its high local level concen-
tration due to the high geographic concentration of industrial production inherited from the 
Soviet period. Analyzing worker attachment in Russia, Friebel and Guriev (2005) argue that 
non-monetary forms of compensation, combined with an inherited monopsonistic or oli-
gopsonistic local labor market structure, can obstruct workers’ ability to migrate and thus tie 
them to their current location. Andrienko and Guriev (2004) find support for the attachment 
hypothesis by estimating that interregional migration in Russia is low and constrained by lack 
of liquidity. Only around 2% of the population changed their residence within the borders of 
Russia per year during the 1990s. The figure decreased to 1.4% in 2002, which is quite low 
compared to the US internal migration rate of 13.7% in March 2002–March 2003.
6 
In this paper, we focus on the role of non-wage benefits in reducing the costs of labor 
turnover as these costs are estimated to be quite substantial for the Russian firms. According 
to Gimpelson and Lippoldt (2001), the total turnover was 46% in 1998. In the mid-1990s, the 
turnover of unskilled workers was high, while firms apparently hoarded white-collar labor. 
Brown and Earle (2003) similarly find that labor flows in the Russian industrial sector in-
creased in magnitude during the 1990s, particularly job destruction and separation. Total wor-
ker flows were nine percentage points higher in 1999 than in 1990. The churning rate (worker 
flows less the absolute value of employment change) was 30–40% during the 1990s. A sur-
vey of 304 Russian industrial enterprises in 2003 (Gimpelson, 2004) also finds that 77% of 
firms experienced a deficit of managers and professionals or highly qualified workers or both, 
indicating tight labor markets. 
                                                 
5 For a recent survey of the Russian labor market in transition, including wage formation, see the World Bank 
report, “The Russian Labor Market: Moving from Crisis to Recovery” (2003). 
6 Sources: Goskomstat, U.S. Census Bureau, and authors’ calculations Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva 
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Little empirical evidence has been offered previously to establish a link between the 
tightness of the labor market, non-wage benefits and employee turnover. While our unique 
firm-level data may allow us to establish this relationship, we must first overcome the chal-
lenges of estimating the value of heterogeneous fringe benefits to employees, especially in 
the absence of outside markets for services. We thus construct survey questions to obtain a 
measure of benefits comparable across firms and ask the manager of each firm about the nec-
essary wage increase needed to compensate employees for forgone services. 
We find strong evidence that Russian industrial firms attempt to use social services to 
reduce costs of labor turnover in the face of tight labor markets. Further, we show that the 
share of non-monetary compensation decreases with improved access to regional social infra-
structure. There is also evidence that the negative effect of benefits on turnover and churning 
is weaker in the regions with more developed social infrastructure. Finally, we note that the 
link between non-wage benefits and employee turnover is weakened by a firm’s high mo-
nopsony power in the local labor market.  
The relationship between labor market tightness, benefits provision and worker turn-
over is the strongest for blue-collar workers.
7 The observed difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar workers can be explained by either wealth constraints (blue-collar workers are 
more constrained in their access to alternative services providers) or by differences in firm-
specific human capital (which may lead to misjudging of turnover costs for white-collar wor-
kers). 
Our findings shed light on the mechanisms of employee compensation formation in an 
imperfect labor market, and emphasize the importance of considering non-wage benefits 
when estimating, for example, returns to human capital, where researchers tend to look only 
at monetary wages. In Russia, there are substantial differences, both between and within 
firms, as to what part of worker compensation comes in the form of non-wage benefits.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of 
our data and the evolution of the provision of benefits from planned to market economy. This 
foundation is essential for understanding the nature of non-wage benefits in a post-communist 
economy. In section 3, we test the effect of tightness of the labor market and density of re-
gional infrastructure on the amount of non-wage benefits provision, and then establish the 
                                                 
7 Gentry and Peress (1994) explore the role of tax incentives in providing fringe benefits using US regional data. 
They find that the effect of tax incentives is positive and significant for blue-collar workers but not for white-
collar workers, even though the share of workers getting benefits is higher among white-collar workers. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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connection between benefits provision and labor turnover. The final section concludes with 
the discussion of major results and their implications.  
 
2  Social service provision by Russian firms:  
Background and survey evidence 
 
2.1  The data  
 
In this paper, we analyze the role social benefits play in the employment strategies of indus-
trial enterprises through survey data collected in 2003 from 404 medium and large establish-
ments in 40 regions of Russia. In the survey we examined the extent of social service and in-
frastructure provision by the firms and the firms’ own assessments of the quality of public 
infrastructure and the regulatory environment. Background information on ownership, in-
vestment, performance, competition, and financing decisions of the firms was also gathered. 
For the firms in our final sample, we conducted face-to-face interviews with the general man-
ager and managers responsible for social and infrastructure affairs. Quantitative information 
was obtained for 2002 and earlier years in some questions. 
In constructing our sample, we concentrated on the industrial sector, and within it 
manufacturing firms for which energy production is not a regular line of business. The source 
of information for the population of firms is the enterprise registry maintained by Goskomstat 
(State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics). We set a minimum size limit of 
400 employees after our pilot interview rounds indicated that smaller firms were unlikely to 
provide infrastructure or social services. Our sampling technique included a combination of 
clustering by region and systematic sampling by size.  
Our sample is quite representative of the Russian manufacturing sector. Compared to 
the population of Russian firms, the majority of industries are adequately represented in terms 
of the share of the firms, as are the federal districts.
8 The fact that we surveyed medium and 
large enterprises explains the bias towards metallurgical firms regarding the distribution of 
industrial employment. The size distribution of our final sample is close to the population 
with the median establishment having 784 employees and the average over 1,600 employees.  
Only 5% of the firms in the sample were established during the 1990s. Most firms we-
re formerly state-owned and privatized during 1991–1994. As in many previous surveys, our Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva 
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sample is biased towards better-performing firms as they tend to be more willing to partici-
pate. 
In addition to survey data, we utilize Goskomstat enterprise registry data and selected 
information on the municipalities and regions where the firms are located. We also use the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, a major annual household survey, for an additional 
test with individual-level data.
9  
 
2.2   Social service provision by firms, 1990–2003 
 
In the planned economy of the Soviet Union, firms were often made responsible for provid-
ing social services to their employees. Most firms maintained considerable physical assets for 
this purpose, including apartment houses, dormitories, health clinics, and day care centers. 
According to Leksin and Shvetsov (1998, 1999), in 1992 not more than one third of the total 
housing stock in Russia was privately owned (mostly individual houses). The rest was con-
sidered public housing and included municipal housing and departmental (vedomstvennoe) 
housing that existed within branch ministries and was managed by enterprises. In the early 
1990s, some 70% of large and medium-sized enterprises offered medical services while over 
75% of large enterprises and 50% of medium-sized enterprises provided day care. 
Fundamental legislation requiring divestiture of housing and the main part of social 
assets was adopted in 1992 and 1993. The transfer of social assets was supposed to be com-
pleted by the end of 1997, and indeed the majority of assets were actually transferred (Leksin 
and Shvetsov 1998, Commander and Schankerman 1997). Roughly 80% of the housing 
stock, medical services, day care, sports facilities and children’s summer camps, as well as 
60–70% of recreation facilities became municipal property during 1993–1997.  
Of the 404 firms we surveyed in 2003, over 90% reported having social assets in 1990 
and over 90% still provided or supported at least one social service in 2003, although the sca-
le of firm participation in social service provision has diminished significantly during the last 
decade (see Table 1). Generally, firms either retained some of their social assets (although on 
a more modest scale) or had replaced those assets with other forms of support such as subsi-
dies to the employees to acquire services. This type of support had gained importance espe-
                                                                                                                                                        
8 See Haaparanta et al. (2003) for detailed analysis of sample representativeness. 
9 For the description of the RLMS data and the data itself, go to http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/ . BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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cially in supporting leisure activities. In housing, not only subsidies but also giving out loans 
or guaranteeing them for the employees had become relatively common.  
A study by the Urban Institute (2004) on regional housing markets notes that the Rus-
sian population still faces a widespread lack of housing. In 2003, the quantity of housing spa-
ce per person was a mere 19.3 m
2. Barriers to development of Russia’s housing market in-
clude the vagueness of rules on distribution and ownership rights for land plots for construc-
tion, underdeveloped infrastructure (water, heating, sewage, etc.), bureaucracy, and red tape. 
These barriers have been created mainly at the regional level, where the authorities have sub-
stantial influence over licensing and other major phases in the construction process. Similar 
entry barriers are present for other social services, which as a rule are still heavily regulated 
and subsidized in Russia. Federal housing subsidies officially were ended at the start of 2006, 




3  Empirical results 
 
In this section, we analyze the determinants of social benefit provision by the firms and its 
effect on turnover and churning. More precisely, we test two main hypotheses: 
 
•  non-wage benefits are used by firms to reduce the costs of labor turnover, which 
vary with the tightness of labor market, and 
•  availability of alternative social service providers reduces the use of non-wage be-
nefits by firms and the effect of these benefits on turnover. 
 
In the first subsection, we establish the link between the tightness of the local labor 
market, density of regional social infrastructure, and the use of non-wage benefits. Here, we 
distinguish between four occupational groups within the firms (managers, professionals, skil-
led workers, and unskilled workers) and examine for the existence of group-specific differ-
ences in how workers are compensated. 
In the second subsection, we look into whether the firms actually succeed in reducing 
labor turnover through service provision. We also test the importance of labor market concen-Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva 
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tration for the attachment strategies. Finally, we confirm our finding of the effect of non-
wage benefits on employee turnover using individual-level RLMS data.  
 
3.1  Tight labor markets and non-wage compensation 
 
We use the following survey question asked from the general managers as a measure of the 
share of social benefits in worker’s total compensation or the importance of services for the 
workers: 
 
If you stopped social services provision to employees, by what percentage approxima-
tely would you need to raise the wage for each group of workers (managers, professionals, 
skilled and unskilled workers) to keep them in the firm?  
 
This measure is the “value of fringes” comparable across firms. Under the assumption 
of heterogeneous preferences often used in the literature on non-wage benefits, even if all 
workers receive an identical package of social services, some workers value it more than oth-
ers. Measured in this way, the share of non-wage benefits in total compensation is our de-
pendent variable.  
Our major explanatory variable is the tightness of the labor market, which is measured 
by the following question asked from the personnel managers: 
 
How much time approximately (in weeks) would you need to fill a vacancy for each 
group of workers (managers, professionals, skilled and unskilled workers)? 
 
These two variables are measured separately for four groups of employees: managers, 
professionals, skilled workers, and unskilled workers. The descriptive statistics on the vari-
ables by four employee groups are presented in Table 2. In line with survey results of Gim-
pelson (2004), these statistics suggest Russian manufacturing firms faced a rather tight labor 
market. In accordance with the Labor Code, employees must notify the employer two weeks 
in advance if they plan to terminate their employment voluntarily. This is less than the aver-
age search time in our sample. An average firm in our sample would need more than a month 
to find a new manager, professional, or skilled worker. The median time needed is two to BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/ 2006 
 
  13 
three weeks. Add to this the time and cost of training a new employee. Thus, a large share of 
the surveyed firms faces indeed high costs of labor turnover. 
As the evidence in Table 2 suggests, Russian firms differ extensively as to the amount 
of social services they provide. For between a third and half of the firms, the value of these 
benefits to workers is positive. The average value of the benefits in these firms is quite high: 
from 17% for managers to 20% for skilled workers, with the figure reaching as high as 100% 
of the wage in some firms. We also measure non-wage benefits in terms of the costs of social 
services provision as a share of the wage bill. Table 2a shows that about a third of the firms in 
the sample spent less than 1% of their wage bill on social services, another third of the firms 
spent 1–5%, and the rest spent over 5%.  
We further provide supporting evidence from individual-level RLMS data for years 
2000–2003 (around 10,000 individuals surveyed each year). According to this data (Table 3), 
the majority of employees enjoyed at least some social services at work in recent years. This 
share is somewhat higher for white-collar than for blue-collar workers, while according to the 
firm survey data the value of the benefits was larger for blue-collar workers, although the dif-
ference is not big. 
10 We also find that skilled workers with longer tenure are more likely to 
receive benefits, which indicates that the social benefits may also be a form of deferred com-
pensation similar to pension plans. 
In Table 4, we present tobit results from regressing our dependent variable for four 
groups of employees on the tightness of the labor market and social infrastructure index. Ta-
ble 5 presents the results of an otherwise similar, but pooled, regression, weighted by the 
share of each group of workers in the firm. We consider tightness of the labor market as ex-
ogenous to the firm.
11 Hence, we need to control for the level of wages in a firm as our meas-
ure of labor market tightness is likely to be affected by the wage the firm offers. We take the 
data on wages from the Goskomstat enterprise registry, which provides this information sepa-
rately for white-collar and blue-collar workers. 
We find that the shortage in the labor market for a given group, measured by the time 
needed to find employees, has a positive and significant effect for both high-skilled and low-
                                                 
10 Oyer (2005) reports results from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in the US. During 1986–2000, 
employers provided 15.1% of respondents with meals, 7.2% with child care, 56.2% with dental insurance, and 
75.8% with medical insurance. The figures for meals and child care are comparable with those of the RLMS 
from Russia (see Table 3), whereas more employees had employer-provided medical care in the US than in Rus-
sia. Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva 
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skilled blue-collar workers.
12 There may be several explanations as to why service provision 
reacts to the tightness of the labor market for blue-collar workers but not for managers and 
professionals, while the costs of turnover of a manager and a high-skilled worker differ little. 
First, it may mean that these groups of workers have different preferences for the structure of 
compensation. Grosfeld et al. (2001) argue that less productive workers are more likely to 
choose a kind of an insurance contract with a high share of social services. However, both our 
survey and RLMS data indicate that amount of benefits received by white-collar workers is 
comparable to what blue-collar workers receive.
13 
The second explanation pertains to wealth constraints. White-collar workers with 
higher incomes should have better access to outside services. Indeed, as private markets for 
such services as housing, medical care and day care are still largely underdeveloped in Rus-
sia, we would expect low-cost alternative providers of such services to be quite scarce. This 
argument, however, should only apply to managers, not professionals as RLMS data indicate 
that the average salary of professionals in the industrial sector does not differ significantly 
from that of skilled blue-collar workers. Even so, our tightness measure is significant for the 
latter but not the former.  
A possible third explanation relates to the differences in firm-specific human capital. 
If white-collar workers have higher firm-specific human capital than blue-collar workers, 
then we simply mis-measure the costs of turnover of white-collar workers for the firm as the-
se costs would include not only the time needed to find a worker but also the costs for the 
worker to accumulate firm-specific human capital. This would explain why, even when both 
groups of workers receive benefits almost equally, our tightness measure is significant only 
for blue-collar workers. Note that in the pooled regression, which comprises differences both 
within and between groups of workers, the tightness variable is highly significant. 
To test our hypothesis that the amount of benefits provided by firms depends on the 
density of regional infrastructure, we include a measure of the general quality of the regional 
social infrastructure in the regressions in Table 4 and 5. The measure is constructed as a first 
principal component based on the following regional level variables: residential area per cap-
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Low supply of certain groups of workers in Russian economy can be explained by external reasons, i.e. the 
massive switch of occupations by manufacturing workers during the sharp industrial decline in the first half of 
1990s (see Sabirianova, 2002). 
12 As a robustness check, we also tested whether regional unemployment or the regional wage level (i.e. the 
workers’ outside options) had any effect and found no connection.  
13 Since Russia has adopted a flat 13% personal income tax rate, differences in marginal tax rates do not affect 
preferences. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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ita, number of places at pre-school institutions per child, number of hospital beds per 1,000 
inhabitants, and number of swimming pools per 1,000 inhabitants.
14 These variables are cho-
sen so as to reflect the four dimensions of social infrastructure included in our survey: hous-
ing, day care, health care, and recreational activities. The components of the index vary con-
siderably among regions. Notably, the amount of residential area per capita ranges from 6.7 
to 28.4 square meters and the number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants varies from 41 to 
332. 
In practice, this is a measure of either the congestion of regional facilities (the lower 
the index, the more congested the facilities) or access to services (the higher the index, the 
greater the accessibility). The regression results confirm our hypothesis to the extent that ac-
cess to local social infrastructure matters particularly for blue-collar workers in the structure 
of compensation, i.e. the greater the access to local social services, the lower the share of 
workers’ compensation in the form of non-wage benefits. In the pooled regression, the index 
of social infrastructure is again highly significant. 
In accordance with earlier studies, economies of scale appear to matter in service pro-
vision. The more employees the firm has, the more services per employee are provided. 
Again, the effect is significant only for blue-collar workers.  
Finally, an interesting observation from the regression results is that the level of wage 
is not related to the value of non-wage benefits. This result contradicts the finding of Olson 
(2002) and others that wages and fringe benefits are substitutes. In line with the regional in-
frastructure analysis above and with the compensating differentials literature, an explanation 
might be that social services represent non-monetary compensation for the local-specific 
amenities, in particular, for the quality of the local social infrastructure.  
 
3.2  Non-wage compensation and labor turnover 
 
In order to prove that firms use non-wage compensation to attach workers, and thereby re-
duce their turnover costs, we need to show that a higher share of social benefits in total com-
pensation is related to lower employee turnover. We regress the turnover measures on the 
share of non-wage services in employee compensation. Our turnover measures include the 
hiring rate, separation rate, quit rate, turnover rate, and churning rate. All rates are calculated 
                                                 
14 The data are for 2003 and taken from Goskomstat’s Russian Regions database. Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva 
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as in Davis et al. (1996) and Burgess et al. (2000) such that worker flows are relative to the 
average number of employees in the current and previous year (i.e. 2002 and 2001).  
Since the survey asked only for the total employee turnover not divided by groups, we use the 
ratio of the total costs of the social services to the total wage bill as a measure of the share of 
non-monetary benefits in total compensation (descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2a). 
Our regression results presented in Table 6 suggest that the higher the share of social services 
in total compensation, the lower the labor turnover. This result applies to hiring, separation, 
and quit rates, as well as to the turnover and churning rates. The effect of fringe benefits on 
the employee churning rate, which is essentially the excessive turnover unrelated to the 
growth or decline of the firm, is the most significant. We thus find evidence that Russian in-
dustrial firms have managed to reduce the volatility they face in the labor market through 
non-wage benefits provision. 
To explore how the local labor market structure affects this result, we measure the 
firm’s monopsony power in the local labor market (share of the firm’s employment in the po-
pulation of municipality) and interact it with our measure of the share of wage benefits in 
compensation. The results in Table 6 show that where a firm has higher-than-average mo-
nopsony power, the negative effect of social benefits on turnover is reduced (the coefficient 
for churning is not significant). Logically, the firm with the highest monopsony power does 
not need to attach the workers by means of non-wage benefits as there are no other employers 
in a locality. 
Finally, we test the found negative relationship between non-wage benefits provision 
and labor turnover on individual-level data from RLMS. The data allow us to regress the 
probability that a person quits the firm in the next year on the binary variable for the receipt 
of social services from the firm separately for the four groups of employees. We run a ran-
dom effects panel probit for the three years of data (2000–2002) for which the information on 
social services received by respondent is available. Only the employees of industrial sector 
firms are included in this estimation.  
The results are presented in Table 7. In accordance with our previous findings for 
firm-level data, the receipt of social services from the firm reduces the probability that the 
worker will quit the firm. However, the result here is only significant for high-skilled blue-
collar workers, i.e. those who are the most difficult to replace according to our firm survey 
data. We also interact the social services dummy with the regional social infrastructure index BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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to check that local infrastructure is actually an underlying mechanism of labor attachment. 
For blue-collar workers, this term has positive and significant coefficient. Thus, in regions 
with well-developed social infrastructure, non-wage benefits do not fulfill their attachment 
function; in infrastructure-poor regions, the attachment power of non-wage benefits is the 
strongest. 
The test on individual-level data further confirms our major result that the firms use 
non-wage benefits to attach workers and thereby reduce labor turnover. The effect of this at-
tachment mechanism is the strongest for blue-collar workers.  
 
4  Policy implications and concluding remarks 
 
The literature on the attachment effect of non-wage benefits has traditionally focused on pen-
sion plans and health insurance and the quit penalty they impose on workers. In this paper, 
we show that other types of non-wage benefits such as in-kind provision of social services 
may also have an attachment effect. The strength of this effect depends on the level of devel-
opment of social services provision in the locality, i.e. the availability of alternative service 
providers. This effect is emphasized in Russia, where, relative to countries with more devel-
oped service markets such as the US or the EU-15, the social sector remains heavily regulated 
and subsidized, creating significant barriers to entry. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the evolution of labor markets in transi-
tion. It is well established that labor turnover has been generally high during Russia's eco-
nomic transition. At the same time, it has been argued that firms try and actually manage to 
tie their employees to themselves by providing part of their compensation through non-
monetary means, such as social services. However, no strong empirical support has been pro-
vided yet for this hypothesis.  
Analyzing a unique data set of large and medium-sized industrial establishments from 
2003, we find strong evidence that Russian industrial firms attempt to use social services to 
reduce the costs of labor turnover in the face of tight labor markets. The effect is the strongest 
for blue-collar workers. We also find that the use of non-monetary compensation declines 
with improved access to local social infrastructure. In this sense, social services provided by 
firms can be viewed as a non-monetary compensating differential for poorly developed local 
infrastructure. We also show that the link between non-wage benefits and employee turnover 
is weakened by the high monopsony power of a firm. In general, given the high share of blue-Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva 
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collar workers in manufacturing, the tightness of the labor market for these workers, and the 
low level of development of markets for social services, the use of social benefits in compen-
sating Russian industrial workers has been quite pervasive.  
Our findings shed light on the mechanisms of the employee compensation formation 
in an imperfect labor market. They emphasize the importance of taking into account non-
wage benefits, for example, in estimation of the returns to human capital, where researchers 
tend to look only at wages. In Russia, as shown here, there are substantial differences among 
and within firms as to what part of worker compensation comes in the form of non-wage be-
nefits. Although the compensation packages offered by Russian firms are partially a historical 
legacy, our data suggest many shared features with e.g. the US labor market. 
Non-wage forms of compensation can, and do, attach workers to the firms, especially 
in the regions with poor social infrastructure. To the extent that they impede labor mobility, 
they also reinforce regional disparities in incomes and living standards. Our results thus pro-
vide an argument in favor of fostering the development of the local social infrastructure, both 
through government policies and involvement of private businesses. This would encourage a 
more flexible labor market as employees would have greater access to social services and be 
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 Table 1. Social service provision: results from firm survey 
Percent of 404 firms total:  Housing  Medical 
care 
Day care  Recreation 
Had assets in 1990  78.5  76.7  69.8  38.2 
      
Have assets in 2003*  39.5  78.5  11.9  25.9 
Have or provide support in so-







Have on balance  34.2  67.1  10.4  20.8 
Support assets transferred to the 
municipality 
5.0 4.0 6.7 0.3 
Give financial assistance to the 
employees in acquiring services 
22.0 42.1 8.9  58.7 
Support otherwise  11.4  8.2  3.0  4.5 
*Answers from the general manager, otherwise from the social manager. Source: Haaparanta et al. (2003) 
 
 Table 2. Descriptive statistics by employee categories 




Average share in firm’s employment, 
 % 
             7.81 
 
14.38 64.00  13.85 
Average number of weeks needed to 









Percent of firms that need to raise wages 
in order to keep employees if it stops 
providing social benefits  
35.93 44.35  51.80  45.86 
Average wage increase needed, % (con-









Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
Table 2a.  Social costs as a share of the wage bill 







N firms  378 
 
 
 Table 3. Percent of employees receiving social services at work, by employee categories (RLMS individual-level     
 data, industrial employees only) 
Employee category  1999-
2000 
2001 2002 2003    of which, 2003: 
        medical recreational childcare food transport 
Managers  78.4  69.5 67.7 53.6  33.9 47.3  3.8  19.6  18.2 
Professionals  80.4  80.5 78.7 72.1  50.3 54.9  13.1  21.0  12.5 
Skilled workers  69.4  76.9 70.4 65.4  39.2 46.3  10.5  24.2  9.6 
Unskilled workers  79.2  72.4 71.4 60.6  35.8 38.6  8.8  17.1  10.7 
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Table 4. Tightness of the labor market and importance of social services for different employee categories, tobit 
Dependent vari-
able: Wage in-
crease needed to 
compensate differ-
ent occupational 













Log of how many 
days it would take 
to find a new… 
    
…manager 0.282     
 (0.595)     
...other profes-
sional 
  1.064    
    (0.716)    
...high-skilled 
worker 
  1.815**   
    (0.776)   
...low-skilled wor-
ker 
   2.446** 
     (0.965) 
Index of the qual-
ity of regional so-
cial infrastructure
1 
-1.709  -2.655**  -3.579***  -2.754** 
  (1.139)  (1.202)  (1.373)  (1.203) 
Log of emplo-
yment in 2002 
0.301 1.501 2.053*  1.762* 
 (0.978)  (0.990)  (1.142)  (0.998) 
Average wage of 
white-collar em-
ployee in a firm 
-0.458 -0.343    
 (1.230)  (1.258)    
Average wage of 
blue-collar em-
ployee in a firm 
  1.260  0.871 
   (1.862)  (1.650) 
Constant -3.469  -11.717  -34.552  -29.550 
  (15.158) (15.832) (21.479) (18.721) 
Observations  323 334 332 334 
 Industry and regional dummies included. Marginal effects reported: unconditional expected value, dF/dx. Stan   
 dard errors in parentheses.         
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
  1 First principal component built on the following regional level variables in 2003. Number of places at pre-    
 school institutions per child, residential area per capita, number of hospital beds per capita, and number of swim  
 ming pools per 1,000 inhabitants. 
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Table 5. Tightness of the labor market and importance of social services for different employee categories, pooled data, 
weighted tobit 
Dependent variable: Wage increase needed to com-
pensate different occupational groups if the firm 
stopped social service provision 
 




Index of the quality of regional social infrastructure  -1.537** 
 (0.762) 
Log of employment in 2002  3.547*** 
 (0.509) 











Observations in a pooled regression are weighted by the number of employees in each skill group (managers, 
professionals, skilled and unskilled workers). Industry and regional dummies included. Marginal effects re-
ported: unconditional expected value, dF/dx. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6. Labor turnover in 2002 and social services, OLS 











Social costs as a 
share of the 
total wage bill  
-0.229** -0.212** -0.160*  -0.423**  -0.393*** 
  (0.092) (0.103) (0.083) (0.170)  (0.151) 
Log of emplo-
yment in 2002 
-0.899 -12.867*** -3.070** -13.779***  0.545 
  (2.154) (4.517) (1.328) (3.865)  (2.554) 
Share of firm’s 
employment in 
local population 
-0.557 1.254  -0.442 0.568 -1.369* 
  (0.581) (0.811) (0.346) (1.028)  (0.826) 
Share of social 
costs*share of 
employment 
0.037 0.045 0.031 0.088*  0.067 
  (0.028) (0.039) (0.020) (0.051)  (0.044) 
Constant 17.817  106.163*** 29.260***  125.846*** 22.058 
  (15.301) (30.563) (9.609)  (27.242)  (18.794) 
Observations  240 239 236 239  239 
R-squared  0.20 0.36 0.24 0.33  0.19 
Industry and regional dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** sig-
nificant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Hiring rate=hiring2002/((empl2001+empl2002)/2)*100 
Separation rate= separations2002/((empl2001+empl2002)/2)*100 
Quit rate= quits2002/((empl2001+empl2002)/2)*100 
Turnover rate=(hiring2002+separations2002)/ ((empl2001+empl2002)/2)*100 
Churning rate=((hirings2002+separations2002)/((empl2001+empl2002)/2)-|(empl2002-empl2001)/ 
((empl2001+empl2002)/2)))*100 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 7. Probability of quitting the firm and receipt of social services, by employee categories (RLMS individual-
level data, industrial employees only, random effects panel probit estimates for 2000-2002) 
 












Receipt of social 
services 
-0.151 0.271  -0.297**  0.276  -0.073 
 (0.455)  (0.194)  (0.125)  (0.377)  (0.093) 
Index of the qual-
ity of regional 
social infrastruc-
ture 
0.135 0.000  0.065 0.233 0.034 




0.324 -0.237  0.280**  -0.529  0.083 
 (0.430)  (0.204)  (0.131)  (0.452)  (0.097) 
Age -0.006  -0.014*  -0.007  -0.026*  -0.009** 
 (0.026)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.004) 
Education (years)  -0.010  0.014  0.023  0.071  0.020 
 (0.085)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.076)  (0.017) 
Tenure -0.017  -0.010  -0.043*** 0.016 -0.024*** 
 (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.005) 
Log employment  -0.123  -0.165*** -0.041 -0.221**  -0.087*** 
 (0.109)  (0.042)  (0.028)  (0.096)  (0.021) 
2001 dummy  -0.493  0.231  0.021  0.280  0.063 
 (0.454)  (0.187)  (0.129)  (0.375)  (0.096) 
2002 dummy  -0.122  0.222  0.063  0.300  0.128 
 (0.436)  (0.184)  (0.125)  (0.374)  (0.093) 
Manager         -0.239 
        (0.209) 
Professional         -0.197 
        (0.151) 
Skilled worker          -0.007 
        (0.136) 
Constant 0.481  -0.172  -0.804* -0.199  -0.502 
 (2.087)  (0.630)  (0.436)  (1.199)  (0.339) 
Observations 122  636  1054  159  1971 
 82  367  652  116  1127 
 Standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies included.       
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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